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Nolan's stage model of computing growth has been widely cited in
the literature on information systems, but surprisingly has not
received a careful analytical review. This paper reviews the Nolan
model, assessing its development, structure, sensibility, and place
within evolution explanations in the social sciences. The model
itself is shown to be an evolving concept, responding to changes in
the field of information systems and organizations. A critical
assessment of the model's major assumptions and claims reveals that
many of these are empirically weak and intuitively implausible,
despite the intelligent insights that went into constructing the
model. The model is shown to be largely an evolutionistic model
rather than an evolutionary model, thus making it subject to many of
the problems of evolutionist models. However, some aspects of an
evolutionary theory are found in the model, making it a useful
contribution to the continuing effort to improve understanding of the
processes of change in organizational information systems over time.
EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS:
AN ASSESSMENT OF NOLAN'S STAGE MODEL [1]
John Leslie King
Kenneth L. Kraemer
University of California, Irvine
INTRODUCTION
The best known model of evolution related to organizational
information systems is the "stage" model of Richard Nolan. This
model, vrhich first appeared in print in 1973, has been cited
extensively as the major statement about the growth of information
systems in organizations. From its beginnings as a tentative
hypothesis (Nolan, 1973), it has become regarded as an empirically
grounded theory (Nolan, 1979) and an accepted description of how
changes in organizational information systems take place over time
(Ahituv and Neumann, 1982; Alter, 1980; Ein-Dor and Segev, 1978;
Keen and Scott Morton, 1978; McKenney and McFarlan, 1981; Rockhart
and Flannery, 1981).
Despite the widespread attention Nolan's model has attracted, it
has never been subjected to a careful analytical review in the
published literature. Given the importance of the model in the
information systems field, and the interpretations of data and
prescriptions for management based upon it, such a review is overdue.
This paper reviews the Nolan stage model in light of the basic
structure of the model itself, and its use as an evolution theory in
the context of evolution explanations in the social sciences of which
it is a part. It concludes with an assessment of the model's
practical utility as a descriptor of the process of change in
organizational Information systems over time.
THE NOLAN MODEL '[2]
The Nolan model does not appear in the literature as a single
model, but in a number of versions developed between 1969 and 1979.
The model originated in discussions between Nolan, Neil Churchill and
F.Warren McFarlan between 1969 and 1971, and was subsequently
elaborated in Gibson and Nolan (1974), Nolan (1977) and Nolan (1979).
Although basic aspects of the model have remained the same over time,
significant elaborations of the earlier model have appeared in later
versions. In this section we examine the development of the model
through these versions.
The 1973 Version
The core concept behind the model first appeared in print in
Nolan's 1973 article in Communications of the ACM. The model was
presented as a hypothesis, but it was grounded in observations and
discussions with managers in three firms. The experiences of these
firms form the base of the "stage theory" of computing growth intended
to meet two conditions adopted from Kuznets (1965): identification of
distinct and empirically verifiable characteristics of change; and
detailed specification of the characteristics of succession whereby
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one stage moves to the next.
To capture the characteristics of change in computing in
organizations Nolan made the assumption that changes in budgets for
computing can serve as a surrogate measure for change in a wide array
of environmental and technical variables, including changes in
indusiiry conditions, corporate sales, organizational strategy,
management practices, and uses of computer technology (Nolan,
1973:401). Plotting the changes in budgets for computing in the three
firms revealed that budgets seemed to grow according to an S-shaped
curve. This led to a second major assumption: that the turning
points in the budget curve (shown in Figure 1) are transition points
between stages of growth. The turning points A, B, and C in Figure 1
break the S-curve into four stages. From here Nolan made a third
major assumption: that these stages "capture the central tendencies"
of the major tasks in the management of computing: planning,
organizing, and controlling. Working backward, the logic of the model
runs as follows: the major activities in the management of computing
are identifiable in stages that correspond to periods of stability
along the growth path of computing use, traced by change in computing
budgets which acts as a surrogate measure of environmental and
technical variables that make up the computing phenomenon in an
organization. Management practices related to computing are thus
explained as responses to environmental and technical changes. (The
complete model based on all versions is shown in Figure 2.)
Briefly, Nolan's four stages from the 1973 model are:
Initiation: Introduction of computing into the organization
to meet basic needs; slow growth in use; beginning of
problems caused by computing's role as a "change agent;"
little management response to these problems; decentralized
control; minimal planning.
Contagion: Top management commitment to exploiting
computing's potential plus great expectations among users
brings major growth in computing use; costs rise rapidly;
a cost crisis stimulates top management to search for
controls to contain costs; centralization begins; planning
remains i^reak.
Control: Top management institutes cost control measures;
planning becomes a major priority; the computing function
is centralized; the DP manager's position is raised in the
organizational heirarchy; priority setting is mandatory;
standards are established for programming, documentation and
operations; chargeout systems are adopted to impose
market-like constraints on use; controls often prove to be
too stringent, resulting in failure to exploit the potential
of computing or meet user expectations.
Integration: Controls refined to allow exploitation of
computing without runaway costs; planning well established;
users are more knowledgeable and capable in their uses of
combenefit operations become more rational; economic
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analyses (eg. cost- analysis) used to set priorities for
ne;? systems; chargeout systems modified to ease restriction
on use; system analysts sometimes decentralized to user
departments to encourage improved systems development;
centralization/decentralization decisions now made in light
of organizational and business strategy; growth slows
markedly, but new investments bring greater marginal
benefits.
Nolan claimed in this article that no organizations had reached
the Integration stage, but that they would begin to do so soon, and
growth in computing costs would begin to decline as they did so.
Using the assumption that the stages capture the management tasks of
control, organization and planning, Nolan summarized the implications
of the model: control is lax in stages I and II; reactionary and
overdone in Stage III; and refined and effective in Stage IV.
The 1974 Version
Although Nolan specifically states that the model does not assert
cause and effect relationships (Nolan, 1973:401), it clearly does so.
This was borne out in the next version of the model (Gibson and Nolan,
1974). This paper translated the descriptive model of the 1973 paper
into a prescriptive tool to aid managers in dealing with computing
growth. The model was used to explain grov/th patterns and to predict
future growth within the context of changes in intra- and
extra-organizational variables such as the emergence of new technology
and increased organizational sophistication in computing use (Gibson
and Nolan, 1974:77). The four stages from the 1973 model were
presented anew, with some changes in their names, and were discussed
in terms of the management challenges each stage poses. The most
important change in this new formulation of the stages was the claim
that the fourth stage, formerly called Integration, was actually a
state of Maturity in use of computing. In this stage, the manager of
the computing enterprize must balance the need for maintaining
stability in computing use against the need to respond flexibly to new
opportunities brought by changes in technology.
At the conclusion of the 1974 article, Gibson and Nolan revised
the 1973 observation, and claimed that some organizations were already
in Stage IV. More importantly, they stated specifically that the
S-curve from which the changes were identified is driven primarily by
changes in computing technology (p.88). They claimed that most
changes to that point arose from advancements in hardware, but that
future changes would come from advances in software, particularly data
base management systems. Such changes were predicted to initiate new
S-curves, and the same integrative problems present in the earlier
four stages would underlie the future S-curves. Thus, technological
change was established as the model's basic causal agent, and
management reactions to those changes were established as the effects
of that cause. Although not noted by Gibson and Nolan, this
formulation posits Maturity as an equilibrium state in which computing
growth is brought under control by appropriate management actions, and
that would persist until new technological changes upset the
equilibrium.
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The 1977 Verj;loD
Nolan subsequently used the stage model in a study of the
effectiveness of chargeout policies in eighteen firms (Nolan, 1977).
In this study, the model was used to describe the firms in terms of
their relative positions on the growth continuum. Although no data
are presented to support the claim, Nolan states that the budget
growth curve was used to develop an initial stage profile of the
companies (Nolan, 1977:30). The detailed data that are presented
suggest that the factoring of the firms by stage was accomplished
primarily by comparing variables in individual firms to the variables
assumed to be associated with each stage as outlined in earier
versions of the model. Four variables were used in this analysis:
the state of the firms°s applications portfolio (eg., what computing
is being used for); the nature of the DP organization within the
firm; the characteristics of management planning and control for
computing in the firm; and the level and character of ®user
awareness" in their use of computing (p.22).
Three important changes appeared in the 1977 version of the
model. First, management responses for dealing with computing were
dichotomized according to Cyert and March's (1956) concept of
"control" and "slack." A control environment was characterized by the
presence of elaborate management systems to ensure efficiency of
computing use (eg., planning, budgeting, performance reviews,
chargeout). A slack environment was characterized by a lack of such
controls and a willingness of top management to spend more on
computing use than is strictly required to do the jobs needed. A
control environment would nurture efficiency but constrain innovation;
a slack environment would nurture innovation but allow inefficiencies.
A second major change in this formulation of the model was the
claim that the S-curve of computing budget changes also represents the
organization's "learning curve" in the quest to control computing
effectively (p.20). This claim, adopted from the work of Estes (1950)
and Jordan (1965), was the turning point in the clarification of
Nolan's model as a learning model: change in technology upsets
organizational equilibrium; increased knowledge on the part of
organizational actors reestablishes equilibrium [3].
Most of the remainder of the 1977 book deals with the
establishment and use of chargeout systems and steering committees as
control tools, and two models of the evolution of such tools are
presented (pages 60 and 128). However, a third basic change in the
stage model was presented at the end of the book (pages 153-160).
Here Nolan claimed that a basic shift was underway in the orientation
of management toward the control of computing. Control was shifting
av7ay from its focus on management of computing as a resource to
management of organizational data as a resource. Nolan predicted that
this shift would be enabled by the advent of the then-new technology
of data base management systems, and that this shift would initiate
two new stages in the model, following Integration (IV). (See points
D and E in Figure 1.) He called the final stage Maturity. This new
fifth stage was not named in the 1977 book, nor were its implications
for the model discussed.
Page 5
The addition of the new stages is important for understanding the
development of the model. First, it fulfilled the prophecy of Gibson
and Nolan (1974) that changes in technology, especially in data base
management, would spur changes in the growth rate of computing. In
this way the model was pushed beyond its descriptive role to a clearly
predictive one. Second, addition of the new stage reinforced the
development of the model as a learning model in which disruptions
brought by technical change can be overcome through organizational
learning resulting in the adoption of management policies to integrate
the technology with the goals of the organization. This integration
would result, in turn, in the equilibrium state of Maturity. The fact
that the previously predicted state of Integration (Maturity) was
either not achieved or was short-lived was not explored in this new
version.
The 1979 Version
The last formulation of the model in the open literature was
Nolan (1979). The ideas presented tentatively in the 1977 book were
described in detail in this final article. The article began with the
recognition that a prediction made by the earlier articles (1973 and
1974) did not come to pass; instead of leveling off as predicted,
computing cost continued to grow rapidly. This failure was said to
result from changes in both the external and internal environment of
organizations occurring after the previous articles were written. The
external changes were the appearance of new technologies and the
knowledge of how to use them. Internal changes arose from the
acquisition of experience, resulting in internal knowledge. Nolan
still used the basic model, but expanded it to include the six stages
discussed at the end of the i977 book. His faith in this expanded
model was based on additional studies made after the early model was
developed (studies in 35 companies and a "large number" of IBM
customers and other organizations; Nolan, 1979:116), although no data
or references to data from these studies were presented.
The 1979 model formalized the "control" and "slack" concept of
the 1977 book, and reanalyzed the four stages of the 1973 model in
light of this concept. The two new stages were included (see Figure
2), and the whole model articulated anew: In Stage I few applications
are installed, control is lax. and planning is almost nonexistent. In
Stage II development is encouraged (ie., greater slack) but lack of
planning results in systems of poor design quality. In Stage III the
problems from bad design and rising costs create difficulties for
users and management, so control becomes tighter. Users almost give
up on getting what they want, but with the advent of data
communications and user terminals they relax and become tolerant of
rising costs they pay through the chargeout system. Top management
has begun to rethink the management of computing in terms of data
resources rather than computer resources. The organization then
enters Stage IV, in which costs continue to rise rapidly as computing
use increases [4]. Data base systems are brought in, which helps the
move toward data resource management. In Stage V the focus of
computing management turns completely to Data Administration, in which
control of computing resources is tight but slack is maintained in
development of systems that bring high added value. Stage VI,
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Maturity, is achieved when the applications portfolio is ^complete"
(how completion is recognized is not specified), and its "structure
'mirrors' the organization and the information flows in the company"
(Nolan. 1979:120).
The 1979 version of the model retained many features of the
earlier models. The budget curve was still used as the primary
indicator of change, although this measure was modified to be the
ratio of computing budget growth to sales growth. Changes in
technology still served as fundamental drivers of changes in the
stages. An end state (Maturity) was still predicted wherein costs
rise slowly and benefits rise more rapidly. But the new version of
the model differed from the earlier versions in important ways.
First, the learning mechanism was fully incoporated. Change was said
to be driven by technology, but modulated through internal adoption
and application of external and internal knowledge. Second, the 1979
model claimed that a basic shift in organizational goals regarding
computing management was taking place, from a focus on management of
the computer resource to the management of organizational data
resources. Finally, the 1979 model moved beyond the limits of its
earlier versions, and was described as a tool for evaluating computing
in individual firms. In closing the 1979 article. Nolan made the
remarkable claim that "there is now a generic and empirically
supported theory of the evolution of the DP activity — the stage
theory" (Nolan, 1979:125).
EVALUATION OF NOLAN'S MODEL
Basic Assumptions of the Model
Nolan's model rests on a number of important claims and
assumptions that invite scrutiny. In this section we will assess
these claims and assumptions in terms of their empirical validity and
their plausibility.
1. Empirical Foundations. We have problems with some central
empirical assumptions that form the foundation of the model. First,
we question the initial hypothesis of the model: that change in
budgets for computing can serve as a surrogate for such important and
different variables as organizational environment, managerial
strategies for growth of computing, and the organization's learning
curve in dealing with computing. Is it reasonable to assume that a
single variable serves as a suitable surrogate for so much? We think
not. It is logically possible that this one variable tracks the
changes in others. but it seems unlikely and Nolan does not provide
any explanation of the probable linkages that would make the claim
plausible [5]. Beyond this. we have problems with the derivation of
such a complex set of stages from the turning points in the curve
tracing budget changes (see Figure 1). Finally, there is little
evidence in any of the versions of the model to suggest that budgets
do follow this curve. Even assuming that Nolan's budgetary data for
all the firms he investigated yield S-curves in conformance with his
claims (the data presented are not sufficient to tell). there is
evidence that many organizations' computing budgets do not show such
behavior. For example. Lucas and Button's (1977) study of computing
budgets in California local governments showed that growth in
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computing expenditures tended to be linear rather than curvilinear (a
phenomenon noticed by Nolan in the 1979 paper). and that more powerful
explanators than Nolan's stage theory would account for this pattern.
This does not destroy Nolan's initial empirical assumption; it
merely weakens its generalizability. V/e cannot test directly the
correspondence between budget growth and changes in other variables
without data on the firms he investigated. Nevertheless, the ideas
embodied in the model can be validated empirically through tests of
its predictions. Here again problems appear. The most obvious is one
Nolan himself acknowledges: the failure of the slow-growth stage of
Integration (Maturity in the 1974 paper) to appear according to
prediction. Nolan explains this failure by extending the model to
incorporate major contextual changes, in particular the shift in
organizational emphasis to management of data resources and the
emergence of data base management technology. But this is merely a
rewrite of the premises to accommodate a change in the conclusions.
If post-hoc analyses reveal flaws in the basic assumptions of the
model, the predictive power of the model must be questioned.
Nevertheless, the model in its later versions is used to make
predictions. For example, in the 1979 version (p.121) Nolan predicts
that the major new growth in computing budgets resulting from adoption
of Data Administration will decline as adoption becomes complete in
2-5 years (from 1979 this means 1981-84). Whether this will happen
remains to be seen.
Two recent empirical studies also raised questions about the
soundness of the model's predictions. One was Goldstein and
McCririk's 1981 study of 273 organizations that tested the model's
prediction that Data Administration would be more formalized in
"mature" data processing departments. The study failed to confirm the
model's prediction. The other was our own study of computing in 56
cities in ten countries (Kraemer and King. 1981). While not
specifically designed to test the Nolan model, this study collected
extensive data on the variables that the budget curve in Nolan's model
is said to capture (eg. environmental variables, computing management
policies, outcomes of computing use). Our data permitted the grouping
of the organizations into categories according to their ^stage" of
computing development. But the study also found that those
organizations using the more "mature" policies for computing
management as articulated by the Nolan model also were suffering from
the highest levels of problems with computing. Either these
organizations had adopted mature policies for computing management but
had not refined them sufficiently to make them work right; or the
whole concept of organizational learning in dealing with computing is
somewhat optimistic [6]. In any case, the primary claims of empirical
support for the predictions of the model come from Nolan himself, and
have not been corroborated by others.
These problems with the empirical bases of Nolan's model restrict
its acceptance as a validated theory in the scientific sense of that
term. The question remains, is the theory Intuitively powerful and
practically useful? By examining the remaining assumptions behind the
model listed above we see that some serious problems remain.
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2. Technological Change. The model holds that technological
change is the primary driving force behind the growth of computing
through the stages (Gibson and Nolan, 1974:88; Nolan, 1977:20;
Nolan, 1979:116). This probably overstates the dominance of this
variable. Technological change certainly plays a role in the complex
of factors that drive change, but there are additional factors that
should be considered. Most important are the "demand-side" factors
that create a ripe environment for technological changes to be
considered and adopted [7]. At least three such forces seem
appropriate for consideration. One is the "institutionalized demand"
created by the extant presence of computing in organizations (Kling
and Scacchi, 1982; Scacchi, 1981). Once routinized computing
applications must be maintained and upgraded over time. Such changes
add to the costs of computing, and to the need for even further
changes (eg. hardware upgrades, more disk storage), irrespective of
changes in technology. Another is demand among users for computer
services arising from powerful but often overlooked aspects of
computing as a politicical resource (Danziger, Dutton, Kling and
Kraemer, 1982; King, 1983; Kraemer, 1980; Markus, 1981). Computing
brings capabilities that are more desirable for some users than for
others, and the use of computing provides departments with
opportunities to justify additional capital, personnel and space
demands. Finally, computing is appealing to many people on purely
affective grounds as an entertaining and status-increasing technology
(King, 1983). These demand-pull drivers of change can and often do
take precedence over the supply-push factors of technological change.
3. Clarity of Organizational Goals. The model assumes that
there are clear-cut organizational goals to be realized through
application of the technology (Nolan, 1973:399; Gibson and Nolan,
1974:88; Nolan, 1977:3; Nolan, 1979:116). This assumption might
apply to some organizations, but not to all, and possibly not to many.
The question of whether organizational goals are uniform and
consistent guides for the behavior of organizational actors, as
opposed to dynamic and changing targets that result from competition
and conflict among organizational actors, has received considerable
attention in the literature on computing (Keen and Scott Morton, 1978;
Kling, 1980; Kling and Scacchi. 1982; Danziger, Dutton, Kling and
Kraemer, 1982; King, 1983; Pfeffer, 1978). This research suggests
that the setting and maintenance of organizational goals is a dynamic
process in which internal disagreements on strategy are only resolved
temporarily through goal-clarifying processes, and that organizational
norms that result are often temporary [8]. If the organizational
goals for the application of computing are themselves undergoing
change, there can be no lasting consensus on how "best" to manage
computing activity, and no reasonable expectation that management will
know what it is searching for in its effort to master the technology.
Very general goals of the organization might be agreed on (eg., making
a profit, organizational survival, sustained growth), but the linkage
between use of computing and the achievement of these broad goals
requires specification of much more detailed sub-goals directed
. specifically at the application of the technology to particular tasks
and needs. Given the array of possible demand-pull factors on the
growth of computing mentioned above, agreement on sub-goals cannot be
assumed a priori, and that different goals of organizational actors
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will have unitary correspondence with agreed-on organizational goals
cannot be assumed at all.
4. Knowledge. The model assumes that increased external and
internal knowledge will eventually lead to effective and efficient
control over computing (Nolan, 19^:20; Nolan, 1979:116). This
assumption poses difficulties because it implies the further
assumption that the "right" knowledge is available and that
organizational actors will acquire and act appropriately on this
knowledge. External knowledge, which in the Nolan model enters the
organization in the form of new technologies and Information about how
to exploit them, varies greatly in its utility. There are many
competing theories about how best to exploit computing, and there are
no proven tests by which a manager can tell which theories are correct
and appropriate for the organization in question. Internal knowledge,
which is based on organizational experience, also varies greatly from
from one organization to the next. Some organizations have been
successful in routinizing sophisticated computing applications, others
have not. According to Nolan's model, successful organizations are
those that have learned how to cope with the technology, while
unsuccessful organizations have not. But what accounts for these
differences in learning? The model does not answer this question.
The processes by which knowledge is brought to bear on problems are
not explained in the model, and there is no specificiation for how the
appropriate policies leading to Integration, Data Administration, and
Maturity are found and applied.
5. Control vs Slack. The model assumes that the task of
effective management of computing is to strike a balance between
"control" and "slack" (Nolan, 1977:22; Nolan, 1979:116). This
implies that top management, which has the prerogative to implement
"control" or "slack" policies, can know when either course is
appropriate for each of the policies they promulgate. Policies must
be chosen from someplace on the "control" to "slack" continuum, but
from where should they be chosen in any given instance? If policies
are to be proactive, management must be able to anticipate when
policies embodying greater control or greater slack will achieve
desired ends. This implies that managers will know which way their
organization is headed in its use of computing. In fact, most
policies for computing management are probably reactive, developed in
response to problems experienced with computing. Control and slack
might be good general descriptors of the characteristics of policies
managers can follow, but simply categorizing policies this v;ay does
not indicate what policies managers should follow.
6. Continuitous Change. The model assumes that change in
organizational information systems is a continuitous process [9]. Our
observations of the processes of change in organizations lead us to
doubt this assumption. The S-curve implies continuitous change, but
does not accommodate the cyclical or recursive behaviors so often
encountered in the development and refinement of organizational
policies. As noted by Moore (1967:259), most organizations exhibit
cyclical behavior in resolving basic policy dilemas such as whether to
centralize or decentralize functions. The adoption of a function such
as the smooth S-curve might be appropriate for characterizing the the
Page 10
ideal theoretical behavior of a single organization, or for
summarizing the aggregate behaviors of a populations of organizations
but it does not fit well the often erratic behavior exhibited by
individual organizations.
These problems with Nolan's model do not disprove the model's
assertions. However, they do raise important questions about the
empirical validity of the model and its utility for describing the
process of change in specific organizations. In the next section we
will assess the model's performance as an evolution theory of the
growth of computing across organizations.
The Model as an Evolution Theory
Nolan describes his model as a theory of the evolution of the DP
activity in organizations (Nolan. 1979:125). In this section we
evaluate the model in the context of evolution theories in the social
sciences to determine the extent to which this discription is correct
In its simplest conception, "evolution'' refers to any succession
of changes that affect an entity (eg., a species, an industry, a
society). The terms evolution and evolutionary are used
interchangably and imprecisely much of the time. A distinction must
be made between models that characterize successions of change by the
direction the change is taking, and those that characterize such
successions of change by their mechanisms (van Parijs, 1981:51).
Models that describe change in terms of direction can be called
"evolutionist" models, and are distinct from "evolutionary" models
that describe change in terms of mechanisms.
The evolutionist perspective assesses history as a developmental
progressive and directional set of changes that increase in their
complexity or perfection with the passage of time. Such theories
embody a clear concept of the direction of change and the destination
of change. Evolutionist models explain the logic of development,
typically in the form of stages that follow one another, and in which
each stage is a precursor for the next one. More elaborate
evolutionist theories extend to the description of the dynamics of
development, in which successions of stages correspond to a path along
which entities are inexorably compelled toward their appointed "end
Evolutionary models, by contrast, are agnostic about either the
direction of change or the likely end state to which change is headed.
Evolutionary models focus on the mechanisms by which changes occur and
new features of entities come into being. Evolutionary mechanisms are
mechanisms of local optimization in which features of an entity change(either through genetic mutation or adoption of new behaviors). and
the new features are preferable to old features in aiding survival of
the entity or improving its chances of satisfaction. If the new state
is "adequate" for the entity (that is. it can survive and reproduce
or it is satisfied), current features are stabilized, resulting in a
new state of equilibrium. The consequences of "selections" made by
these mechanisms feed back and influence the process of change toward
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a new state of locally optimized equilibrium.
An initial reading of the model, particularly in its earlier
versions, suggests that it is an evolutionist theory. The persistence
of change in information systems is noted, and the model attempts to
explain the course of change in terms of its direction (growth) and
its "end state" (Integration or Maturity). This formulation, as with
many evolutionist theories, bears a striking resemblance to "life
cycle" models that parallel the process of change in living organisms
(birth, growth, maturation), although there is no expectation of a
final state of demise (death). The model stops at maturity.
The other evolutionist characteristic of the model is its focus
on the logic of what happens rather than on the mechanisms by which
particular changes take place. Although discussions of the model
embody predictions about further changes, these predictions are based
mainly on the trends in past change. The model concentrates more on
these trends in change than on the persistent features of the entities
(organizations that use information systems) and why they are there.
The explanations of the presence of features are functionalist in that
they account for the purpose of the features, but generally within a
rationalistic framework in which organizational actors learn what to
do and then do it. While the primary incentive for change comes from
without in the form of changes in technology and external knowledge,
the reaction to this change is purposeful on the part of the
organization's leadership. As with many of the better known theories
of social evolution, especially those arising from the philosophy of
Hegel's dialectics, a constant tension between change in environment
and organizational reaction to change is the primary structural
feature of the model [11]. The evolutionistic twist here, in these
social theories and in Nolan's model, is the belief that an end state
is somehow eventually achieved.
To the extent that Nolan's model is an evolutionist theory, it
exhibits the same strengths and weaknesses of other evolutionist
theories. The primary strength of such models is their attention to
the logic of past development, which can be assessed empirically as
long as correct historical accounts of change are available. In this
sense the Nolan model does ring true, as many of its characterizations
of the history of organizational information systems are insightful.
In the end, the predictions made using such models might very well
turn out to be correct. If a model truly captures the basic driving
forces behind change and accurately specifies the relationships
between these forces, and assuming that larger contextual features of
the "change space" do not themselves change, there is nothing to
prevent evolutionist theories from being powerful predictors.
However, the primary weaknesses of evolutionist theories rest
precisely in the generality of their perceptions of reality and the
resulting difficulty in assessing their factual correctness. Such
theories are concerned with the broad picture of change, and not with
the actual experiences of change in individual cases. The lack of
mechanistic explanation in these theories makes them difficult to test
empirically at the level of individual instances of change. Rather,
they can be empirically tested only by examining the correctness of
their historical accounts or by waiting to see whether the predictions
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made using them turn out to be correct. Evolutionist theories are
therefore useful organizing frameworks that might prove to have been
insightful and correct once enough time has passed to see whether
their predictions have come to pass. But they do not explain why
changes happen the way the way they do. This limits their utility in
explaining changes or predicting the future of change in specific
instances.
There are elements of evolutionary explanation in the Nolan
model, too, and these are worth noting. Gibson and Nolan (1974) first
suggest the possibility that the "end state' of maturity is not in
fact an end state, but rather an equilibrium state. This allows an
interpretation of the model in terms of locally optimized equilibrium
states common to evolutionary theories. Under this construction,
there are forces of environmental change (eg., technological change,
new external knowledge) that affect the current state of an entity
(the organization) that is capable of recognizing that the changes
have altered its chances of satisfaction under the current state. The
entity is also capable of recognizing (through internal learning) that
local alternative states are comparatively attractive. A mechanism
used in evolutionary explanations in social sciences called
'reinforcement" causes the entity to alter its persistent features
(behaviors) to correspond to those alternatives [12]. If adoption of
the alternative features provides sufficient improvement in
satisfaction to accommodate the environmental change, and no other
locally available states appear more attractive, the entity has
evolved to a new state of locally optimal equilibrium.
In this interpretation, the selection choices available to the
entity in its search for satisfaction are limited to policy options
that range from ®slack' to 'control" along one dimension. There can
be a number of different policies adopted, and each policy falls
somewhere along the slack/control continuum. The earlier versions of
the model portrayed policy as a monolithic variable: the sought-after
state was a simple balance between slack and control (although these
terms were not used). In later versions, the model is modified to
accept greater control in some variables and greater slack in others.
The preferred state would result from balance between slack and
control for each major policy variable.
In an effort to improve its recognition of what policies are
appropriate, the organization evolves toward a state of improved
planning; that is, an intensified effort to anticipate the future and
develop appropriate controls for the present to improve chances of
future satisfaction. But in this the Nolan model departs somewhat
from a truly evolutionary theory. Planning implies the anticipation
of consequences, and in its ultimate formulation, the presence of an
omniscient actor capable of seeing the future. The presence of such
an omniscient actor would remove all aspects of evolutionary
explanation and substitute instead a purely 'actional" explanation
[13]. Since we cannot assume omniscience, the goal of planning is
less to provide foresight than to anticipate a bounded set of likely
characteristics of the future, and assess options that might improve
satisfaction under each anticipated case. The reinforcement mechanism
in this case continues to operate through consequence-feedback, and
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planning remains limited to educated guesswork [15].
CONCLUSION
On close examination, the Nolan model reveals some shortcomings.
The empirical bases of the model are questionable, and some evidence
is available that they are factually mistaken. Many of the other
structural assumptions of the model are too simplistic to be useful,
or are simply implausible. As noted above, the criticisms of the
model we provide do not eliminate it as a contender in larger effort
to figure out how computing systems evolve in organizations. They
simply suggest that the model is flawed in important ways, and that
much more vigorous empirical testing might discredit it altogether.
Nevertheless, the Nolan model has had a powerful influence on the
information systems field. The popularity of the model probably comes
from its bold approach to dealing with a phenomenon of great
complexity in a straightforward and clever manner. There are many
aspects of the model that ring true to researchers and practitioners
alike. It attempts to capture the larger organizational context
within which computing occurs, and to draw relationships between the
various components in this context. It also integrates the insightful
contributions of other research, particularly in its characterization
of the accommodation of computing as an organizational learning
process, and in specifying the choice range for selecting policies
between "slack" and "control" options. Regardless of the validity of
the model itself, much of the analysis that appears in the articles
that develop it is highly useful in describing the kinds of changes
that do happen in computing environments and speculating about why
they happen. The model has earned a place in the tradition of
research in information systems for its longitudinal perspective on
computing use, and its incorporation of the larger milieu within which
computing use takes place.
NOTES
1. The work reported in this paper has been supported by grants from
the National Science Foundation. The opinions presented here are the
authors' and should not be ascribed to the National Science
Foundation. Authors' names are listed in random order.
2. We use the title "Nolan Model® for convenience. Nolan himself
described the origin of the model and the role others played in it in
Nolan (1977:21).
3. Gibson and Nolan (1974) suggest obliquely that the stage model is
a learning model, but the claim is not made explicit until the 1977
version.
4. A curious puzzle is evident here. A major purpose of chargeout
policies was to impose market-like constraints on users of computing
that would help attenuate uncontrolled growth. Did chargeout fail?
The model does not say.
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5. There is an implicit danger of circularity in this kind of model.
The shape of the cost growth curve is due in large part to the
influences of the major variables of environment, technology, etc.
Yet the curve is used to demonstrate what changes in these variables
take place. The model is too loosely specified to see whether this
danger is serious. It could be that the behavior of the cost curve is
not significantly caused by the changes in these other variables, but
merely correlates with them. In this case there would be no
circularity, but the claim that the cost curve does capture the
behavior of the other variable would be correspondingly weaker without
empirical evidence to back it up (cf., van Paris, 1981:27-30,
112-114).
6. As with the Lucas and Sutton (1977) study, our research was
conducted in local governments. An argument can be made that our
findings are entirely explained by differences between corporations of
the kind Nolan studied, the counties Lucas and Sutton studied, and the
cities we studied. We doubt it, however.
7. The concept of "supply-push" and "demand-pull" in the process of
innovation diffusion is extensively explored in Tornatzky, et al
(1980) .
8. Among the versions of the Nolan model, Gibson and Nolan (1974) and
Nolan (1977) come closest to acknowledging conflicts in goal setting.
In neither case is such conflict explored as Important for the
assumptions of the model.
9. Continuitous change means that change occurs in a logical
gradation of steps within a single series, and is an assumption common
to many theories of social evolution (Nisbet, 1969).
10. This brief discussion of evolution concepts in the social
sciences is informed by several sources, particularly van Parijs
(1981, especially chapter 2), Moore (1967) and Nisbet (1969).
11. 3ee Nisbet (1969, chapter 5) for an extensive discussion of this
matter.
12. A thorough discussion of reinforcement as an evolutionary
mechanism, and particularly its dissimilarity to the more commonly
cited natural selection mechanism, is found in van Parijs (1981,
chapter 4). The natural selection mechanism has been applied to the
analysis of computing growth by Swanson (1982).
13. The actional view refers to the deliberate actions of entities
given correct anticipation of the consequences of action (van Parijs,
1981:18-20, 51-53).
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